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Applying Scriptural Exegesis to the Interpretation of
Article III of the Constitution
Maria L. Ciampi*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1987, the United States will celebrate the two hundredth anniversary of the writing and signing of the Constitution. Yet even in
this bicentennial year, the community of constitutional scholars remains sharply divided over both the meaning of many of the document's provisions and the appropriate method of interpreting the
constitutional text. One major schism in constitutional scholarship is
that between interpretivism and noninterpretivism. The interpretivist
espouses constitutional interpretation limited to the original intention
of the framers, which can be derived solely from the constitutional
text and its history. The noninterpretivist, on the other hand, applies
extratextual norms in ascertaining constitutionality when the document itself provides little or no guidance.
The conflict between interpretivism and noninterpretivism is essentially a battle over the appropriate scope of judicial review. For the
interpretivist, judicial review is limited to an analysis of "the text,
the history, and their fair implications"' for two reasons. By injecting
extratextual values into its interpretation of the Constitution, the
interpretivist believes that the noninterpretivist appropriates the role
of legislator thereby destroying the carefully delineated and constitutionally mandated separation of powers. Furthermore, the noninterpretivist subordinates the will of the electorate to the will of the
non-elected judiciary which endangers the representative republican
form of government. The noninterpretivist rebuts both of the interpretivist's contentions by first noting that the judge applies society's
values, not his own. 2 As a result, the judiciary, representing the voice

*
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1. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind.
L.J. 1, 8 (1971).
2. Taylor, Brennan Opposes Legal View Urged by Administration, N.Y.
Times, Oct 13, 1985, at A36, col. 3.
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of society, acts as a check and balance on the legislature, just as the
framers envisioned. In addition, the noninterpretivist argues that the
court will be the representative of the minority "electorate, frequently
underrepresented in a majority-rule legislature and lacking access to
the super-majority amendment process." 3
The proper sphere of judicial review cannot be determined unless
the role that the framers intended for the judiciary in the constitutional system established in 1787 is ascertained. Several constitutional
scholars have contended that the original intention of the framers is
impossible to discover. Justice William Brennan, for example, has
argued that the "original intent" is unattainable because of the
"problematic nature of sources" and the "distance of two centuries." ' 4 If the interpretivist-noninterpretivist debate is ever to be
resolved and if the meaning of any provision of the Constitution is
to be learned, an attempt must be made to ascertain the original
intent of those who authored the Constitution.
The principal weakness of existing schools of constitutional interpretation is that, while each school pledges allegiance to original
intent, each in reality merely pays lip service to the constitutional
text which embodies that intent. Few theorists have developed a
systematic methodology of textual exegesis to support their constitutional analysis. An appropriate methodology must examine the
historical, philosophical, and literary background of a constitutional
text which confers on the provision its true meaning.
Modern literary theory provides the tools for textual exegesis.
Literary analysis utilizes principles which systematically unfold the
historical, philosophical, political, and literary forces which determine
the authorial intent of a legal document. The Constitution, as all
5
law and literature, is the product of the time in which it was written.

3.

Id. L. Pollak, THm CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME CouRT: A Docu-

MENTARY HisToRY 154-155 (1966). It is through the judiciary that the rights of the
minorities will be protected because the popular electorate has traditionally refused
to afford protection to minority rights. L. Pollak, supra, at 155. Thus, for example,
every right which has been attained for one minority, the homeless, has been
obtained through the judiciary and not through the electoral process. See Note,
Building a House of Legal Rights: A Pleafor the Homeless, 59 ST. Jom,'s L. Rlv.
530 (1985).
4. Taylor, supra note 2.
5. Hutchinson, From Cultural Construction to Historical Deconstruction,
94 YALE L.J. 209, 220-21 (1984). The full meaning of a text cannot be learned if
the text is considered to be historical. In a recent Harvard Law Review article,
Robert Cover eloquently discussed the relationship between historical-literary circumstances and the legal text. See Cover, "Nomos" and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REv.
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Most legal scholars would find this statement self-evident. Undoubtedly,
[t]o offer this as an exciting and new foundation for critical inquiry
is to run the real risk of being dismissed as trite. Yet mainstream legal
and literary theorizing has managed to flourish through a studious
avoidance of this insight, contriving to maintain that the production
and reception of texts occur in a social vacuum, drained of political
and economic matter. Contemporary theorizing has all but ignored
the ideological dimension of language even though all interpretation
assumes an entire structure of values .... Politics is inscribed within
language. Authors, readers, and critics exist within a complex web of
private and institutional relations and values.
While often paraded as scholarship's highest ambition and achievement, the constant refusal to historicize
represents the tragedy and not
6
the triumph of modern scholarship.
While several constitutional scholars employ modern literary theory
in constitutional analysis, none have utilized principles of literary
analysis to ascertain the original intent of the framers. For example,
critical legal studies utilize modern literary theory to foster the
reader's, rather than the author's, role in giving meaning to a text.
Proponents of critical legal studies assert that, in both law and
literature, the "authorial intention" defines the meaning of the text.
The primacy of the author's intention creates a hierarchical relationship in which the reader is dependent on the author for guidance as
to the text's meaning. Yet the reader also controls the author since
the reader is the final arbiter of the author's intention. Critical legal
scholars argue that the reader's control over authorial intent must
be fostered particularly in the area of law. For the law is "the

4 (1983).

We inhabit a nomos-a normative universe. We constantly create and maintain
a world of right and wrong, of lawful and unlawful, of valid and void ...
No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives
that locate is and give it meaning. For every constitution there is an epic, for
each decalogue a scripture. Once understood in the context of the narratives
that give it meaning, law becomes not merely a system of rules to be observed,

but a world in which we live.
In this normative world, law and narrative are inseparably related. Every
prescription is insistent in its demand to be located in discourse-to be supplied
with history and destiny, beginning and end, explanation and purpose ...
History and literature cannot escape their location in the normative universe,

nor can prescription, even when embodied in a legal text, escape its origin
and its end in experience, in the narratives that are the trajectories plotted
upon material reality by our imagination.

Id. at 4-5.
6.

Hutchinson, supra note 5, at 220-221.
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product of-and vehicle for creating-" [society's] political and moral
values.' '7 Critical legal scholars accurately assess the problem of
rendering the Framers' original intention meaningful to future generations of readers whose problems and values have changed since
1787. Nonetheless, this school of constitutional interpretation has
failed to set forth the principles of textual analysis by which critical
legal studies have determined that the constitutional framers did not
provide for constitutional accommodation of society's political and
moral values in each generation.
The principles of literary analysis which this article maintains
should be applied to interpret the Constitution are those developed
by scriptural exegetes and are collectively known as "redaction criticism" .8Several reasons exist for this choice of analysis. First, biblical
scholars utilize principles basic to the analysis of any form of
literature. Second, these principles are well-developed and have enjoyed wide acceptance over a considerable period of time. Third,
scriptural theologians have successfully applied these tenets in solving
several of the same problems of interpretation which constitutional
scholars face. The latter's problems include, for example, the identity
of the framers, the meaning of vague provisions, and the function
and meaning of the amendments. Finally, the similarities and differences between the scripture and the Constitution have been recently
discussed by such constitutional theorists as Thomas Grey, 9 Robert
7. N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1986, Book Review Section, col. 1, at 1. Critical
Legal Studies fails to recognize the text as a valid starting point for adapting to
society's changing needs from generation to generation because the critical legal
scholar does not understand how to read the text. The critical legal scholar reads
the text and finds internal inconsistencies, convincing the scholar that the authorial
intention is therefore unimportant. The reader's interpretation as a result is really
all that matters since the text can offer little guidance.
The "deconstructionist" tendencies of present legal scholarship are dismaying.
They unveil a fundamental misunderstanding of critical analysis. Certainly every
text has a number of levels of meaning. That was the author's intention. Where
these levels contradict, it would be presumptuous of the modern legal scholar to
think that only he could see the inconsistencies and not the very author of the text.
Instead the scholar should ask herself why the author embodied such inconsistencies.
The scholar will probably find that this is precisely what the author intended the
reader to ask herself and that the author had a particular reason for incorporating
the inconsistency into the text.
8. N. PERRIN, WHAT IS REDACTION CRITICISM? (1970).
9. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1984). In his
article, Grey rejected theories of constitutional interpretation which relied on the
constitution-scripture analogy to support an expanded role for the court. Grey
recognizes that, in accord with both modern Catholic and Protestant biblical
scholarship, the Bible is not a "divine lawbook or encyclopedia" but, rather, a
literary work. The Constitution, on the other hand, is a legal instrument, and not
a literary work. Id.
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Burt10 and Sanford Levinson." Misguidedly focusing on the constitution-scripture analogy, however, these scholars have overlooked the
true contribution of scriptural scholarship: a wealth of exegetical
principles.12
Redaction criticism employs four basic exegetical steps in interpreting a given text. The historical, philosophical, and political
background of a particular provision is examined. According to one
early nineteenth century constitutional scholar, Henry Baldwin, the
meaning of a specific provision of the Constitution can be accurately
attained only if, "[t]he circumstances under which the Constitution
was formed, the history of the times, the mischief of the [Articles
of] Confederation, and the motives which operated on the statesmen
of the day' '1 3 are discovered. Secondly, the literary genre, or form,

10. Burt, ConstitutionalLaw and the Teaching of the Parables,93 YALE L.J.
455 (1984). Burt notes in his work three elements of commonality generally considered
to exist between the Constitution and the Bible. According to Burt, the Constitution
has become a sacred document whose source of authority, the sovereign will of the
people, is considered divine. See id. at 467. In addition, both sacred texts "claimed
unquestionable authority [while] admit[ting] weakness to command obedience." Id.
Finally, the judge's role is that of priest, prophet and exegete. Id. Supreme Court
decisions, in particular, are parables which seek to awaken the people to their own
vulnerability to lead them back to the path from which they have strayed. See id.
at 467-71.
11. Levinson, "The Constitution" in American Civil Religion, 1979 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 123.
12. Grey argues that, unlike the Bible, the Constitution is not a literary work,
but is instead a legal instrument. Grey, supra note 9, at 13-14. While a literary
work is interpreted metaphorically, according to Grey, a legal instrument is interpreted literally as written. Id. According to Grey, this is what Marshall meant in
emphasizing the writtenness of the Constitution and in saying that, "It is a
constitution we are expounding." Thus, Grey can see no use for applying methods
of scriptural interpretation to constitutional analysis. Id. at 14- 15.
The closest attempt in exploring the wealth of exegetical principles in areas of
study outside of law can be found in a 1985 Symposium of the Southern California
Law Review. The first part of the symposium consists of articles exploring interpretation methodologies from other disciplines. The last article in this section is an
article by Robert L. Thomas, Issues of Biblical Interpretation, 58 S.CAr. L. REv.
29 (1985). This article presents the methods of biblical exegesis, including the
grammatical-historical and the historical-critical-linguistic method.
The second section of the symposium, "Hermeneutics and Legal Interpretation,"
contains an article by Ronald R. Garet entitled Comparative Normative Hermeneutics: Scripture, Literature, Constitution, 58 S.CAL. L. REv. 35 (1985). In this article,
Garet discusses the existence of normative hermeneutical principles in scripture,
literature and constitutional interpretation. However, the author still failed to draw
any practical exegetical principles from his scriptural or literary analyses to apply
to constitutional interpretation.

13.

H.

BALDwiN,

A

GENERAL ViEw oF T=

ORIGIN AND NATURE OF TiE

CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 11

(1837).
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of the work must also be ascertained because the literary genre is
essential to discovering the meaning of the text, "[flor the correct
understanding of what the ... author wanted to assert, due attention
must be paid to the customary and characteristic styles of perceiving,
speaking, and narrating which prevailed at the time of the ...
writer," that is, to "contemporary literary forms.' 1 4 The third step
in the exegitical process is to explore the structure and unity of the
work for this will reveal the meaning of a provision, not only in its
particular context, but also in relation to the rest of the document.
Lastly, the text is compared with prior drafts or earlier forms. This
comparison highlights changes in the language of the provision which
reveals, in turn, changes in the author's purpose or emphasis.
The purpose of this article is to determine whether the framers
intended the judiciary to have the power of judicial review and, if
so, whether the power was to be broadly or narrowly construed. This
determination is important because it will answer the question of
whether future generations, and minorities in particular, are relegated
to the legislative and amendment processes for the protection or
attainment of rights and privileges. The scope of the judiciary's
power under the Constitution, will be ascertained by applying the
principles of redaction criticism. Each of the four fundamental
exegetical steps will be applied to an examination of Article III of
the Constitution which defines the scope of federal judicial power.
II.

A.

STEP ONE-THE HISTORICAL-PoLIcAL BACKGROUND OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY AND THE JUDICIAL POWER

The Historical-PoliticalBackground of the Federal Judiciary

The doctrine of judicial review is consistent with the framers'
intention to create an independent judiciary with the power to enforce
14.

"The Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation," in THE DOCUMENTS
I 120 (1966). The literary genre is the literary form of a work, for
example, whether a piece is a short story, poem or novel. Understanding the literary
form or genre used by an author will help the reader to discover the authorial
intent. For
[tihose who search out the intention of the writer must, among other things,
have regard for "literary forms." For truth is proposed and expressed in a
OF VATICAN

variety of ways, depending on whether its form is that of prophecy, poetry,
or some other type of speech. The interpreter must investigate what meaning
the sacred writer intended to express and actually expressed in particular
circumstances as he used contemporary forms in accordance with the situation
of his own time and culture.
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constitutional mandates in face of federal and state legislative resistance. Prior to 1787, the existence of an independent judicial power
was virtually unknown in America. 5 Under British rule, the colonists
had no power to establish a judiciary. As the Declaration of Independence makes clear, "[the King] obstructed the Administration of
Justice by refusing his assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary
powers."' 16 At the same time, the judicial system which the British
set up in the colonies was not well-developed and independent from
the legislature'7 and had limited power. The British judiciary in the
colonies consisted of the vice-admiralty courts, the colonial tribunals,
and the Privy Council. The vice-admiralty courts governed cases of
prizes and captures and were presided over by the royal governor or
his judge-appointee.' 8 Colonial tribunals decided domestic disputes. 19
Unlike the vice-admiralty courts and the colonial tribunals, the Privy
Council was not a court but was an arm of the British legislature
which acted as an intermediary between the king and the royal
governor.20 Nonetheless, in the colonies, the Privy Council exercised
judicial power by hearing appeals from the colonial tribunals 2' and
deciding boundary disputes between the colonies. 22
With the outbreak of the Revolutionary War, the British judicial
system in the colonies collapsed. 23 The states, now free to institute
their own judicial systems, were quite reserved in so doing. In the
state constitutions, the judicial branch was separate from, but "decidely subordinate" to, the legislative and executive branches. 2A The
only courts of any real and independent power in the states were the
prize courts. The rash of privateering which accompanied the out-

15.

H. HocKETT, Tm CONSTTUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 154

(1939).
16. The Declaration of Independence para. 8 (U.S. 1776).
17. H. HOcKETT, supra note 15, at 172.
18. J. JAMESON, ESSAYS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY

OF THE UNITED

STATES IN THE FoRMATIVE PERIOD 4-5 (1899).
19. See H. HocKETr, supra note 15, at 52-53.
20. Id. at 52.
21. Id. at 53.
22. Id. at 2, 154-55.
23. J. JAMESON, supra note 18, at 5-6.
24. H. HocKETT, supra note 15, at 118; P. SMIrH, THE CONSTITUTION: A
DOCUMENTARY AND NARRATIvE HISTORY 70 (1978). While the state constitutions
provided for a separate judicial branch and vested the judicial power in this branch,
there was no "clear definition of the relationship between the legislature and the
courts." P. SMITH, supra at 70.
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break of the Revolutionary War required that the states establish
their own vice-admiralty courts.2
With the end of the Revolutionary War, the need for the prize
courts decreased and the weakness of the state judicial system became
clear. However, the Articles of Confederation, ratified in 1781,
instituted an even weaker judiciary than that incorporated in the
state constitutions by failing to make any provisions for an independent judiciary. 26 The Articles contained "the germ, but only the
germ, of a judicial system in the power [of Congress] to provide
courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed 'on the high
seas', for 'determining final appeals in all cases of captures' and
for' the settlement of disputes among states."'27 Proposed amendments to create a federal court with the authority "to try and punish
federal officers for misconduct, to hear cases on appeal from state
courts involving treaties, law of nations, regulations of commerce,
collection of federal revenues, and cases in which the United States
is a party" were rejected in the debates on the Articles. 28 In short,
as finally adopted, the Articles of Confederation provided for a
judiciary with a minimum of authority.
The framers of the Constitution recognized that one of the principal
defects of the Articles of Confederation was its failure to provide a
peaceful means to assure state and individual compliance with the
Articles' mandates. 29 Military power was the only method of compliance provided for in the Articles.30 Through the creation of a
judicial branch, the Convention believed it could accomplish peaceful
submission to constitutional mandates:
It may be done by the application of military power, without adjudication; or it may be done through the agency of a tribunal, which
adjudicates, ascertains the guilty parties, and applies to them the
coercion of civil power. This last is the peculiar function of the

25. J. JAMESON, supra note 18, at 4-5. Succumbing to congressional impetus,
the states created federal prize courts following a Massachusetts model. H. HocKrr,
supra note 15, at 156. Appeals from these courts were initially heard by a fivemember committee appointed by Congress; in 1780 Congress established a more
permanent and authoritative tribunal, the Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture.
Id. at 157.
26. H. HocKETT, supra note 15, at 146-47.
27. Id. at 146.
28.

M. FAuRAD,

CONSTITUTION

29.

DOCUtMENTARY HISTORY OF TH

RATIFICATION OF TM

G. CURTIS, CONSTITuTIoNAL HISTORY OF rm UNITED STATES Vol.

56 (1896).
30.

Tim

166-67 (M. Jensen ed. 1976).

Id.

1, 351-
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judiciary; and, in order that it may be discharged effectually, the
judiciary that is to perform this office must be a part of the government
whose laws it is to enforce. It is essential to the supremacy of a
government that it should adjudicate its own powers and enforce its
31
own laws.
State tribunals could not be relied on to ensure the state's obedience
to constitutional law, 3 2 for the power of state legislatures was steadily
growing and state constitutions did not provide either a clear separation of powers or a means for the judiciary to act as a check on
the legislature. 33 The Convention, therefore, provided for an independent federal judiciary to be composed of "one Supreme Court,
and . . . such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time
' 34
ordain and establish.
The federal judiciary's power under the Constitution is a great
deal more far-reaching than that under the Articles of Confederation.
The judiciary retains jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases
and over disputes between the states, 35 and additional judicial jurisdiction extends to "Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls.1 36 Most notably, however, the new Constitution
conferred jurisdiction on the judiciary over "all Cases, in Law and
in Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which will be made, under their
Authority. ' 37 In short, the federal judiciary has the authority to
38
enforce compliance with the laws of the nation.
The Convention specifically denied the federal judiciary one power:
the revisionary power. Proposed by Charles Pickney, James Madison,
Gouverneur Morris and James Wilson, the revisionary power was a
topic of great debate by the framers.3 9 The revisionary power was

31. Id. at 352-53.
32. Id. at 352.
33. H. HocxErTr, supra note 15, at 175.
34. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
35. Id. at § 2.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. G. CRTnrs, supra note 29, at 354. By extending the jurisdiction to "all
Cases in equity and law, arising under the Constitution, the laws of the United
States and the Treaties . . . " the Convention made the federal judicial power
coextensive with that of the national legislature. Id. H. HocKErr, supra note 15, at
236. In short, "[under] the scheme of distributive powers its authority on the judicial
side should extend to all cases arising under the legislature resulting from the powers
assigned to it." Id. at 213.
39. P. SMrri, supra note 24, at 118-19, 129-30, 203.
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the power of the President, together with the members of the national
judiciary, 4° to veto any legislation proposed by the national legislature. 41 The purpose of this power was to guard against 'legislative
usurpations'
which threatened "public liberty." The revisionary
power proponents argued that only the combined executive and
judicial veto power "could withstand Congressional assault." 42 However, the majority of the Convention refused to extend this right to
the judiciary. 43 Several of the framers feared that judges, having
participated in the formation of federal laws, would be biased in
their interpretation of those laws. 44 Additionally, the Convention
wanted to assure the separation of powers between the judicial and
45
legislative branches.
In the Constitution, the framers clearly established a separate and
independent judiciary with power to enforce constitutional mandates.
Independence was achieved, not only by not making the judiciary an
arm of the legislature, as it had been in the Privy Council and the
Articles of Confederation, but also by denying the judiciary the
power to legislate through the power of revision. By giving the
judiciary authority over cases "arising under the Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties," the Convention intended
to provide the Constitution with enforcement power markedly absent
in the Articles of Confederation. The revisionary power, however,
was expressly denied because it usurped the legislature's power to
make the law. Yet, to truly enforce the Constitution's provisions, it
would be necessary to invalidate any federal or state law violating
the Constitution. Whether the framers intended the judicial power
to include the power of judicial review cannot be clearly discerned
from such a broadly worded provision, and the Constitution's silence
is difficult to explain. Nonetheless, this doctrine of judicial review
had its historical roots in both Great Britain and America prior to
1787 and was well-recognized by the framers at the time of the
convention.
B.

The Historical-PoliticalBackground of the Doctrine of Judicial
Review
The doctrine of judicial review is said to be the contribution of
the prominent seventeenth century English legal authority, Lord
98.

supra note 28, at 169-70; P. SMrr,

40.

M.

41.

M. FARAMND, supra note 28, at 238.

FA1RAm,

42. Id. P. SMITH, supra note 24, at 129-30.
43. P. SMITH, supra note 24, at 118-19, 129-30, 203.
44. Id. at 119, 130.

45. Id. at 130.

supra note 24, at 97-
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Edward Coke. In 1610, in his decision in Dr. Bonham's Case, the
then Judge Coke stated that an act of Parliament is void if it "is
against common right and reason, or repugnant or impossible to be
performed." 46 Later, in a work entitled Second Institute, Coke asserted that any parliamentary act which contradicts "the great
charter," the Magna Carta, "shall be holden for none. ' 47 Although
some scholars have argued that Coke's proposition in Dr. Bonham's
Case and in Second Institute is merely a principle of statutory
construction and not a mandate for judicial review, 48 Coke's statement gradually became the basis in America for the doctrine of
49
judicial review.
As early as 1761, Coke's statement was recited in the colonies to
argue that an act of Parliament was unlawful 0 Up to that time the
British were permitted writs of assistance, or search warrants, to
search colonists' houses for contraband.5 1 The colonists disdained
these writs which "required no oath by the person seeking the writ
as to what he expected to find; they were not limited to any particular
premises or goods but were general in nature. ' 52 Before the Crown's
judges in the Superior Court in Boston, James Otis, representing
Boston Merchants, argued that the writs of assistance violated fundamental law. 5 Although his argument was rejected by the British
court, it was precedential for the establishment of the doctrine of
judicial review in America.5 4 Citing Coke, Otis contended that legislative power must succumb to constitutional limitations and that
the judiciary's function was to enforce legislative obedience to these
5
limitations.

46.

A. HowARD, THE

sTrruTIONALISM iN AMmuCA

RoAD FROM RUNNYmEADE: MAGNA CARTA AND CON-

122 (1968).

47. Id.
48. Id. at 121 n.26; H. HocrEr'r, supra note 15, at 75-76 (doubtful Coke's
quote accurately represented English law in the seventeenth century).
49. A. HowARD, supra note 46, at 121.
50. H. Hocscnrr, supra note 15, at 77 & n.13 (no cases "before 1761 in
which colonial court set aside act of colonial legislature on the ground of unconstitutionality").
51. A. HowARD, supra note 46, at 133.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 135.
54. Id.
55. Id. Otis argued that there were three possible checks on parliamentary
acts: public opinion, colonial representation and judicial determination of invalidity.
H. HocKErr, supra note 15, at 79-80. Otis' argument is important because it presents
the doctrine of checks and balances which would become a focal point in the debates
of the Convention of 1787. See id.
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Apart from the British influence of Edward Coke, British rule
through the Privy Council exposed the colonists to the doctrine of
judicial review.5 6 One purpose of the Privy Council was to assure
that the laws of the British dependencies were consistent with those
of the motherland.5 7 Where incompatibility existed, the colonial law
was invalidated. 8 Thus, for example, in 1677 the Privy Council
"annulled three acts of the Virginia legislature on the ground that it
had exceeded its powers." 5 9 In addition the Council exercised judicial
review by hearing appeals in cases in which a colonial statute allegedly
60
violated the colony's royal charter.
As a result of the influence of Coke and the colonial experience
of the Privy Council, it was not surprising that the newly declared
independent states would show signs of the acceptance of the doctrine
of judicial review. Indeed, even during the colonial period at least
one colonial tribunal had pronounced the doctrine by declaring a
British act, the Stamp Act, unconstitutional . 6 Between 1776 and
1787, the state courts increasingly suggested that they possessed the
power of judicial review.6 2 For example, in 1782, while validating
the Treason Law of 1776, Judge George Wythe of Virginia stated
that "if the whole legislature . .. should attempt to overleap the
bounds, prescribed to them by the people, I in administering the
public justice of the country, will meet the united powers, at my seat
in this tribunal; and, in pointing to the Constitution, will say to

56.
57.
58.

A. HOWARD, supra note 46, at 279 & n.58.
H. HocKErT, supra note 15, at 52.
Id.

59.

Id.

60. A. HOWARD, supra note 46, at 279 & n.58.
61. Id. at 146; E. Corwin, supra note 49, at 141. According to Corwin, "[i]n
1765 the royal government recognized that the prevailing argument against the Stamp
Act was that it contravened the Magna Carta and the natural rights of Englishmen
and therefore according to Lord Coke" was "null and void." Id. Indeed, at the
time of the First Continental Congress the doctrine of judicial review was already
taking shape; the Pennsylvania resolutions had determined that many statutes were
unconstitutional because they violated fundamental law. A. HOWARD, supra note
46, at 177-79.
62.

S. GOLDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND SUPREME COURT DEcIsIoNMAKINo

4 (1982); accord P. SMrrm, supra note 24, at 118- 89. According to Goldman, "there
is some evidence that even before the Constitution of the United States came into
being, some state courts may have been hinting that they had the definitive say in
interpreting their state constitutions." S. Goldman, supra. Goldman notes that there
has been an ongoing debate in constitutional law over precisely to what extent state
courts expected to exercise the power of judicial review. See id. As an example of
this debate, Goldman compares the book CoNGREss VERsus THE SuPREmE COURT by
Rauol Berger with GOVERNMENT BY THE JuDicL.RY by Louis Boudin. See id.
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them, here is the limit of your authority; and hither shall you go,
6' 3
but no further.

Several state courts actually exercised this judicial power. 4 For
example in the Ten Pound Case and in Bayard v. Singleton, the
New Hampshire and North Carolina courts respectively declared a
state legislative act unconstitutional.6 5 In the few cases in which state
courts exerted this power prior to the ratification of the Constitution,
state judges frequently alluded to Coke's statement concerning the
66
supremacy of the Magna Carta as fundamental law.
The state tribunals' gradual acceptance of the doctrine of judicial
review reflected the need to halt the unchecked growth of state
legislatures beyond constitutional limitations.6 7 The state constitutions
incorporated the idea of the separation of powers, but not the means
by which to enforce this separation, the doctrine of checks and

balances.6 8 Furthermore, the Articles of Confederation did not contain any means of checking the power of legislatures.6 9 Invoking the
doctrine of judicial review, state courts could cripple unconstitutional
70
legislative advances.

63. A. HowARD, supra note 46 at 281.
64. Id. at 280 & n.62; H. HocKTT, supra note 15, 173-77; accord L. LEvY,
JUDGmiENTs 29-33 (1972).
65. H. HocKETT, supra note 15, at 176-77; L. Lnvy, supra note 64, at 31.
The seminal authority for the notion that the state courts exercised the power of
judicial review prior to the ratification of the Constitution is Trin AmmIcAN
DocTRnqE

OF JuDIciAL

SuPREMAcy by Charles Grove Haines. Haines argues that

the state court use of the review power influenced the framers to incorporate the
doctrine into the judiciary's power in Article III. The author cites, however, only
seven state cases to support his argument. What makes Haines' argument more
problematic for authors like Leonard Levy is that many of these cases are arguably
apocryphal. See L. Lnv, supra note 64, at 30.
At least two cases have been deemed genuine precedents for state court exercise
of judicial review between 1776 and 1787, the Ten Pound Case and Bayard v.
Singleton. In the Ten Pound Case, a New Hampshire court declared an act of the
state legislature to be unconstitutional. In Bayard, "[t]he court took jurisdiction of
a case contrary to a state directing dismissal." L. Levy, supra note 64, at 31. In
both cases the deciding judges were reprimanded for their actions. Id. Similarly, as
a result of its decision in Trevett v. Weeden, a Rhode Island court was remonstrated
by the state legislature which mistakenly believed that the court had declared a state
law unconstitutional. Id. at 30. Despite the small number of instances of state
judicial exercise of the review power, the doctrine was clearly recognized by state
courts prior to the Convention.
66. A. HowARD, supra note 46, at 280.
67. H. HocKErT, supra note 15, at 174-75.
68. Id. at 172-76, 277.
69. See supra note 29.
70. H. HocKErr, supra note 15, at 172-76.
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At the time of the Convention, the framers were fully aware of
the growing power of state legislatures. In addition, there was a
realization that the judicial system of the states and the system
embodied in the Articles of Confederation was too weak to stop
legislative usurpations. 71 The authors of the Constitution also foresaw
possible unbridled growth of Congressional power if a system of
checks and balances was not incorporated into the new government's
framework. 72 The Convention proposed the Council of Revision to
act as the watchdog of the national legislature. 73 However, this
proposal was rejected because it would destroy the separation of
powers by giving the judiciary the power to legislate. 74 As an alternative to the power of revision, several members of the Convention
offered the power of judicial review. 75 John Marshall and Patrick
Henry argued that this authority was necessary to prevent congressional infringements of the Constitution; W.R. Davie and Charles
Pickney contended that this prerogrative was essential to impede state
legislative usurpations. 76 Several of the framers, however, including
Dickinson, Mercer 77 and Richard Dobbs Spaight, 78 voiced opposition

to judicial exercise of the review power. According to Dickinson,
' 79
'"[t]he justiciary of Arragon ... became by degrees the lawgiver.' 1
In its final form, the Constitution is silent as to a judicial power of
review of legislation.
Constitutional quietude is not unnatural in light of the fact that
the members of the Convention were sharply divided over the validity
of this judicial power. 0 On the other hand, the absence of an express

71. See supra notes 31-33.
72. See H. HocKETT, supra note 15, at 177-78. One way in which Congress
had acted outside constitutional limitations by the time of the Convention was "by
adopting ordinances for the national domain," such as the Northwest Ordinance.
M. FARRArN, supra note 28, at 63.
73. See supra notes 39-42.
74. See supra notes 43-45.
75. G. CuRTnS, supra note 29, at 594.
76. H. HoCKrTT, supra note 15, at 277-78. Charles Pickney introduced a
draft of the Constitution at the Convention in which he argued for a federal
judiciary which would watch over the legislature. Id. at 186.
77. L. PoLLAK, supra note 3, at 153.
78. L. LEvy, supra note 64, at 24.

79. L.

POLLAK,

supra note 3, at 153.

80. A. HowARD,supra note 46, at 276-83; see H. HocKrv, supra note 15,
at 213-15, 277-79. According to Pollak, although the question of judicial review
was not fully decided at the Convention, "the weight of numbers seems to have
been on the side of those who anticipated courts would exercise such a power." L.
PoLiAK, supra note 3, at 156.
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empowerment is significant for several reasons. At least one of the
framers stated that the revisionary power should not be given to the
judiciary "as they will have a sufficient check against encroachments
on their department by their exposition of the laws, which involved
a power of deciding their constitutionality." 81 Even those members
of the Convention who objected to judicial review recognized the
necessity of some judicial check on legislative powers.82 Second, in
the Federalist Papers, written immediately after the constitutional
convention, Hamilton and Madison argued that 'the power of
judicial review was a central feature of the [proposed] constitutional
scheme."'83 Third, the letters of Louis Guillaume Otto8 4 and James
Madison,8 5 written immediately after ratification, suggest that the
federal judiciary possessed review power, at least in regard to state
legislation. Finally, the very purpose of a separate and independent
judiciary was to give sanction power to constitutional mandates
presumably against both the state and federal legislative encroachments.8 6 One sanction would have to be the power to declare legislative acts unconstitutional.
Several reasons have been offered to explain constitutional silence
concerning judicial review. The first and most obvious reason is that
87
the framers did not intend to confer this power on the judiciary.
A second possible explanation is that the framers themselves, although aware of its existence, did not fully understand the doctrine.88
On the other hand, the possibility exists that the delegates to the
Convention were completely aware of the doctrine and "just assumed
the power as innering in courts under a written constitution.''89
The original intention of the framers in the creation of an independent judicial branch was to check and balance the possible unconstitutional encroachments of the federal and state legislatures. If
the delegates intended to achieve this result then the only viable

81. P. SmrrI, supra note 24, at 118-19.
82. L. POLLAK, supra note 2, at 159. During the Convention Dickinson voiced
his opposition to the doctrine of judicial review, but "was at the same time at a
loss as to what expedient to substitute." Id.
83. Id. at 156.
84. M. FARRAND, supra note 28, at 424 (vol XIII).
85. Id. at 444.
86. See supra note 31.
87. L. LEvY, supra note 64, at 31. Levy poses the central question, "If the
framers intended judicial review, would they have omitted a provision for it, allowing
it to rest on so precarious a foundation?" Id.
88. H. HocKrTT, supra note 15, at 213.
89. Id. at 213, 277-79.

DUQUESNE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:13

explanation for the absence of an express judicial review power is
that the framers understood that the written constitution is not the
final pronouncement of judicial power. However, only an examination of constitutional "genre" and "language" can prove these
assumptions correct.
III.

STEP

Two-THE LITERARY GENRE OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
ARTICLE III

A.

Introduction

In order to ascertain the meaning of a particular constitutional
provision, the scholar cannot confine herself to the words of the text
but must also examine the literary background of the text. The
language of a work mirrors the time in which the author lives:
language reflects the mind and heart of both the writer and the
reader, and, beyond that, the political, cultural and sociological life
of the audience for whom the author writes. 90 Indubitably, one of
the major flaws of present constitutional scholarship is the failure to
recognize the Constitution as a literary work. The constitutional
scholar analyzes the text but can find no meaning there because she
refuses to discover and explain the relationship between the language
of the text and the time, mind and audience of the author. 9'

90. HUTcmNsoN, supra note 5, at 209.
91. J. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEm MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND
RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMmuNITY (1984). In his book,
James White explores the relationship between language and community. He does
so through an examination of several major classical writings from different periods
of history. One chapter discusses three major documents from America's early
history: the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and McCulloch v.
Maryland.
Through an analysis of these classical works, White hopes to exemplify the manner
in which traditional language was creatively employed by the author to revitalize
both self and community. His thesis is an attempt to counteract the deconstructionist
movement in present constitutional scholarship which renders the text meaningless.
A pivotal piece for his argument is McCulloch v. Maryland because it illustrates
how the language of the Constitution was revitalized through Marshall's interpretation of the text.
White's work has been criticized, however, because of its failure to incorporate
into its methodology of interpretation the historical background of the writing. See
HUTCHINSON, supra note 5, at 223. According to Hutchinson,
[A]lthough he characterizes writing as a pivotal mode of social action, White
fails to consider the historical situation of particular acts of writing and
reading. He ignores the socio-economic determinants of the texts he interprets.
Indeed, with revealing honesty, he states that "[ideology] has figured largely
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In speaking to her audience, an author uses the language with
which her audience is familiar, that is, "the customary and characteristic styles of perceiving, speaking, and narrating which prevailed
at the time.' '92 Through the use of contemporary literary forms or
"genres," the author expresses an idea to an audience in a manner
which she knows will be understood. The literary genre is a silent
agreement between writer and audience for the conveyance of a
particular truth. An example of this in biblical scholarship is the
literary form of the parable. A parable was a literary genre wellrecognized at the time of Jesus through which, in story form, a
speaker taught the listener a lesson. The audience of Jesus' time
knew that, when Jesus spoke in parables, the story was not to be
taken literally, but only the lesson. Without awareness of the existence
and purpose of the literary form of the parable, contemporary biblical
scholars would be unable to fully understand the messages Jesus
proclaimed through the parables.
In interpreting a literary work, therefore, the genre must be ascertained. At the same time, the structure and unity of the work must
be analyzed. A particular text is not an isolated unit, but rather, a
part of "the pattern and movement of the work as a whole." ' 93 The
precise placement of the provision in the entire piece suggests certain
meaning. In addition, a provision is part of the authorial plan of
the entire work, deriving meaning from that which came before and
that which follows. Finally, the language of the particular provision
must be examined. The author's choice of language in the present
text uncovers her meaning.

in battles with which we have nothing to do." Moreover, White overlooks
the historical specificity of his own interpretive strategies. Rather than remain
true to his declared view of language as social action, he reads into his major
"transhistorical" texts the basic tenets of humane pluralism.
HUTCHINSON, supra note 5, at 223. White's work, however, is brilliant as an answer
to deconstructionism. In addition, it supports one central thesis of this article, that
is, the constitutional authors injected real meaning into the document which revitalized an Articles of Confederation "community meaning" and which can be found
through the use of biblical exegetical principles.
92. "The Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation," in THE DOCUNMNTS
Or VATICAN 11 120 (1966).
93. Teachout, Worlds Beyond Theory: Toward the Expression of an Integrative Ethic for Self and Culture, 83 MicmGAN L. Rv. 649, 855 (1985). An author,
as any writer, has an authorial plan for her entire work. She organizes her piece in
accordance with that plan and each portion of the text is given a role in setting out
this plan by its placement within the structure of the writing.
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The Literary Genre of the Constitution

In addition, language from earlier "drafts" of the present text
suggest connotations the author wished to emphasize or de-emphasize.
The Constitution of 1787 is a distinct literary genre. 94 The Constitution is a written manifestation of the intention of a people to be
bound, by their sovereign will, in community with one another
through the establishment of a government which will promote that
community. The language of the Constitution makes clear that the

unity is not that of a mere confederation or social compact. First,
the preamble states that the document is a constitution. 95 Second, by
declaring that "We the people ... do ordain and establish this
constitution," the document cannot be a confederation because a
confederation "is a mere treaty or league between independent states,
and binds no longer, than during the good pleasure of each. ' 96 Nor
can the Constitution be a social compact or contract. A contract
suggests that two or more parties are distinctly, and for possibly

different reasons, acting for a common goal; however, in this instance, the people are acting collectively for the same reasons and
for the same goal.
The "literary" Constitution has several salient characteristics. By
its very terms the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. 97 The
94. The Constitution of 1787 is a distinct literary genre but is not the typology
for all future constitutions. See H. VAN MAARSEVWEN AND G. VAN DER TANG,
WRTTEr

CONSTITUTIONS (1978). Van Maarseveen and van der Tang state that there

is no universal type of constitution since all different political systems have constitutions. See id at 241-42. I agree that the 1787 constitution is not a prototype of
all future constitutions. Typology, however, is not the same as literary genre.
Van Maarseveen and van der Tang's work is a striking example of comparative
constitutional methodology. However, because of the overbreadth of the work, the
authors are unable to arrive at any useful explanations to explain differences in
structure and language of various constitutions. Furthermore, some of the rare
conclusions which the authors present are misguided. For example, van Maarseveen
and van der Tang suggest that:
[i]f, on the other hand, the constitution is old, one can achieve little by using
the historical-legal method of interpretation. Neither the events leading up to
the constitution's introduction nor the intentions of the framers provide much
guidance any longer; the constitution as it is stands separate from the past.
The same applies to the grammatical method of interpretation: it is difficult
to interpret an old text literally. Id.
Nonetheless, the field of comparative constitutional study is not only interesting,
but is also useful in the exegesis of the constitutional text.
95. U.S. Const. preamble; cf. MA Const., VA Const., and Articles of
Confederation.
96.

J.

STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

319 (1970).
97. U.S.

CONST. art.

VI.
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binding force of the constitutional mandates is evidenced by the
frequent use of the word "shall." The terms of the document are
politically neutral although the document mirrors the creation of a
socio-political community. 98 The Constitution displays three additional striking characteristics. First, while often the provisions are
specific, sometimes the provisions are vague and general. For example, section two of article four states that "[t]he citizens of each
state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens
in the several states." 99 Second, in certain instances the constitutional
mandate is clear but the means of carrying out that mandate are not
stated. Thus, the supremacy clause states that "[tihis Constitution,
and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the
land."'' l No provision, however, "is expressly included for enforcement of the supremacy of the Constitution. Finally, the Constitution
employs a unique literary convention-"we the people."
The American Constitution is possibly the first written national
constitution.' 0 ' However, there did exist several predecessors of the
Constitution of 1787 which influenced its formation. These predecessors include the Magna Carta, the colonial charters, and the state
constitutions. The Magna Carta, or "Great Charter," became part
of English law in 1215. The document was essentially a demand of
the barons to the English Crown for a restoration of limitations of
authority on the king. At the time the document was written, the
British King, King John, had caused unrest because of "the heavy
financial burdens imposed upon the realm by King John's unsuccessful wars on the Continent, abuses perpetrated upon all ranks of
men by royal officials, the spoilation of church property, [and] John's
harsh use of debts and other devices to secure political discipline
among his subjects. ' 102 While virtually in permanent written form
by 1225, the Charter was revised throughout the centuries in order
to adapt to the changing circumstances of each generation. 0 3 The

98.

H. HocKETr, supra note 15.

99. U.S. CONST. art. IV.
100. Id. art. VI.
101. H. VAN MAARSEVEEN AN G. VAN DER TANG, supra note 94, at 261-62.
Among the "archetypes" of the American Constitution, as suggested by van Maarseveen and van der Tang, are the Union of Utrecht of 1579, the Fundamental Orders
of Connecticut, and the colonial charters. See id.
102. A. HowARD, supra note 46, at 6.
103. Id. at 8-9, 83-84, 147, 150, 168, 299, 373.
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Magna Carta was reconfirmed throughout British history as the law
in Britain not only because of its adaptability, but also because the
Great Charter was considered fundamental or supreme law.'04 As
fundamental law, the Magna Carta determined the validity of other
English laws. 05
The Great Charter played an important role in early American
history as well as in British history. The Charter was carried across
the ocean through the influence of Edward Coke and through the
intellectual leaders of the American colonies, including William Penn,
James Otis, and John Adams.'06 Colonial America believed and
articulated that the Magna Carta was fundamental law. 0 7 In presenting grievances against British rule, the colonists relied on their
rights, as Englishmen, guaranteed by the specific provisions of the
Great Charter.108 In so doing, however, the early Americans frequently stretched the document's actual provisions. Thus, for example, the colonists argued that the Stamp Act violated the right to
trial by jury and the right to consensual taxation secured by the
Magna Carta. Indeed,
[i]t took a fair amount of evolution and interpretation for the requirement ...

that no scutage or aid be imposed save by "common

counsel" of the kingdom (a provision omitted in the reissue of the
Charter of 1216) to become the right to being taxed only by consent.
Similarly it was some time after 1215 before chapter 39's guarantee
of judgment by peers became equated with trial by jury. Yet over and
over the American colonists rested these rights in the Magna Carta,
as in the resolutions against the Stamp Act and in their resolutions in
1774.109
Despite the Magna Carta's prominence in early American history,
its provisions were not incorporated into the Constitution of 1787.110
One reason for this is that the document was a more useful tool for
pre-independence arguments of the rights of individuals than it would
have been for providing a framework for a new government."'
Nonetheless, in 1789, when the Bill of Rights was added to the

104. Id. at 8-9, 78, 81-82.
105. T. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 12 (1955).
106. A. HowARD, supra note 46, at 570.
107. Id. at 78, 81-82.
108. Id. at 372.
109. id. at 373.
110. Id. at 371. At the Convention, the delegates did not even discuss the
Magna Carta or its influence on the new constitution. Id.
I11. Id.

1987]

INTERPRETING ARTICLE III

Constitution, it incorporated many provisions from the Magna Carta.12
Perhaps the most significant influence of the Great Charter, however,
was the colonial acceptance of a written document as fundamental
law, capable of being expanded beyond the written word to meet the
changing needs of future generations.
The rights enunciated in the Magna Carta were specifically "granted
to colonial Americans in the colonial charters. The charters were
promulgated in England for the purpose of instituting the administrative, executive, legislative and judicial mechanisms in the colonies.""' Beyond this, however, the colonists considered the charters
to be a compact between the king and his subjects and, therefore,
fundamental law. 114 As such, the colonists invoked the protection of
the charters against acts of Parliament which violated their rights as
Englishmen." 5 Thus, when the First Continental Congress convened
to set down colonial grievances against Great Britain, the colonial
charters "serve[d] as an example as to how the rights of colonists
are to be expressed.""16 Furthermore, not only were the colonial
charters an additional example of written instruments embodying
fundamental law, but, after 1776, these documents were also more
influential than the Magna Carta in the actual formation of state
constitutions. The colonial charters incorporated all of the basic
provisions for the structure of the government as well as the guar7
antees of "rights of Englishmen.""1
In the formation of their constitutions, the states utilized the form
and substance of the Magna Carta and of the colonial charters. Like
the Great Charter and the colonial charters, the state constitutions
8
were the embodiment of fundamental law in a written document."
The state constitutions also incorporated "the rights of Englishmen"
espoused by the Magna Carta and the colonial charters. In fact,
eight of the state constitutions included a Bill of Rights relying
heavily on the earlier documents." 9 For the states, the guarantee of
these rights was of primary importance in the formulation of their
constitutions. "Law and order there must be [in a constitution]. A

112.
Carta into
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. One example of the incorporation of the provisions of the Magna
the Bill of Rights is the due process clause. See id.
H. VAN MAARSEVEEN AND G. VAN DER TANG, suprd note 94, at 262.
A. HowARD, supra note 46, at 167.
Id.
Id. at 178.
Id.at 204.
H. HocKETT, supra note 15, at 118.
Id. at 119.
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frame of government there must be. But a bill of rights: that came

first."' 12 0 Finally, particularly from the colonial charters, the constitutions borrowed the framework of government-the legislative, ex-

ecutive and judicial branches-although the constitutions provided

12
for a greater separation of powers. '
One characteristic of the state constitutions, however, differentiated
them markedly from the Magna Carta and the colonial charters. The

states clearly enunciated in their constitutions that the government
derived its power solely from the people and not from the rulers of
the people. For example the Virginia Bill of Rights began: "[A]I1
power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people; that
magistrates their trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to
them.' 22 That the state governments obtained their power solely
from the people is supported by the fact that these constitutions were
drawn by convention and not by the legislative body.1u
In writing the Constitution, the Convention relied to a great extent
on the literary works familiar to its audience. The core of the
governmental structure contained in the colonial charters and particularly in the state constitutions was borrowed, and developed, by the
framers in 1787. From the state constitutions, the framers adopted
the central notion of the Constitution: that the government derives
its power solely from the governed. The delegates made use of a

literary convention which was prominent in both the state
constitutions' 24 and the Declaration of Independence 25 "We

...

the

120. A. HowARD, supra note 46, at 203.
121. H. Hocr..rT, supra note 15, at 118.
122. A. HowARD, supra note 46, at 57. The preamble of the Massachusetts
constitution illustrates that the government of the newly formed United States of
America derived its power from the people. The preamble states:
The body politic is formed by a voluntary Association of individuals; it is a
social compact, by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and
each with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the
common good.
H. HocrcETT, supra note 15, at 120.
123. H. HocKETT, supra note 15, at 113. When the Massachusetts Charter
was suspended by Great Britain and the colony decided to set up its own government,
the original plan for constructing the government was rejected because a group
called the constitutionalists argued that "there was no legitimate basis for the
government of Massachusetts since the people had not had any say about the kind
of government there should be." A. Howard, supra note 46, at 208. Subsequently
a constitutional convention was convened which fashioned the Massachusetts Constitution. Id. at 209.
124. See, e.g., VA. CONST. § 2.
125. Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776)
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representatives" of the people was reformulated to clearly highlight
that the people are the source of the government's power, thus "we
the people."
The framers borrowed not only the central ideas and language of
the charters and state constitutions; the delegates also appropriated
the literary form. For, based on their knowledge of the charters, the
constitutions and even the Magna Carta, the American people were
intimately acquainted with written documents which embodied fundamental law and expressed the will of the people to establish a
government. Most importantly, however, the framers' audience was
well acquainted with the expansiveness of written fundamental law
beyond the four corners of the document. For, in their interpretation
of the Magna Carta, the colonists moved clearly beyond the words
or fair implications of the text in order to meet their changing needs.
Indeed, the structure and language of article three of the Constitution
evidences the framers' intention to allow for expansion of the doctrine
of judicial power to meet the needs of future generations.
IV.

STEPS THREE AND FOUR-THE STRUCTURE, UNITY AND
LANGUAGE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787

The structure of the Constitution is simple, clear, and well-organized. Prior to 1789 the document's structure was as follows:
Preamble (people united to form government)
Legislative Branch
Executive Branch
Judicial Branch
State Governments in the Federal System
Amendment Power
Supremacy Clause
Ratification
The framework of the Constitution of 1787 differs from most of the
original thirteen states' constitutions because a majority of the early
state constitutions included a Bill of Rights. 2 6 Indeed, in some state
constitutions, the Bill of Rights preceded the provisions for the state's
governmental structure. 127 This difference in structure between the
126. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
127. See A. HowARD, supra note 46, at 205. In some state constitutions, the
Bill of Rights preceded any provisions for a governmental framework. In such cases,
the convention was apparently more concerned with assuring that the rights of the
state's citizens were protected than with establishing a government. The reason for
this priority was that the state already had sufficient precedent from the colonial
governments to continue their own, but did not have the precedent for the guarantee
of individual rights. See id.
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state constitutions and the 1787 Constitution can be explained in
several ways. The framers' failure to include a Bill or Rights may
suggest that the Convention believed that the states would provide
sufficient protection of individual rights. At the same time the state
conventions were convened around the time of the Declaration of
Independence and, therefore, evidenced a greater concern with declaring their rights and freedom than with constructing a new government. Ten years later and after winning a war against Great
Britain, the framers wanted to unify the people under one government. As a result, the original Constitution did not contain a Bill of
Rights.
The Constitution and the Articles of Confederation also differ
greatly in structure, again suggesting a shifting concern of the framers. A preliminary note is that the Articles are not as clearly
organized as the Constitution. The Articles were organized as follows:
Preamble (greetings from the states)
Article I Confederacy as United States of America
Article II Declaration of State Independence
Article III States as League of Friendship
Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, Provision for Treason,
Full Faith and Credit Clause
Article V State Representation in Congress
Article VI Restriction on State Treatymaking
Article VII Troop Selection by States
Article VIII Disbursement of Cost of War to States
Article IX Congressional Powers
Article X Powers of Committee of States
Article XI Admission of Canada to the Union
Article XII Payment and Satisfaction of Debts
Article XIII Requirement of State Adherence to Mandates of Congress
and Articles Ratification
Several of the provisions in the Articles of Confederation, such as
the privileges and immunities clause, the full faith and credit clause,
and congressional powers, were included, with modification, in the
Constitution. Unlike the Constitution, however, the Articles focused
primarily on the role of state governments in the formation of a
national government. From the preamble and article three, it is clear
that the Confederation derives its power, not directly from the people,
but instead from the states. In addition, the core of the Articles
discusses the division of power, rights and duties between the state
and federal government. Thus, whereas the Constitution refers to
the states only in article four, the Articles of Confederation speaks
about the states in every article except article nine (congressional
powers) and article eleven (admission of Canada to the Union). The
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structure of the Articles of Confederation reveals a second major
distinction from the Constitution. The Confederation designated a
separate article for only one branch of government-the legislative
branch. In fact, the Articles do not provide for an independent
judicial branch or for any executive branch. From their emphasis on
state government and failure to provide for more than one branch
of the federal government, it may be inferred that the authors of
the Articles of Confederation were far less concerned with establishing
a well-developed federal government than were the framers of the
Constitution.
The structure of the Constitution of 1787, on the other hand,
reveals the framers' intention to create a well-developed government
composed of three separate, independent, and equally powerful
branches. Three of seven articles, constituting two-thirds of the
document's length, are devoted to a discussion of the framework of
the federal government. The first three articles set forth the legislative,
executive and judicial branches respectively. In stark contrast to the
Articles of Confederation, in the Constitution each branch is given
its own article. In addition, each branch is examined in great detail,
although more attention is given to the legislature, less to the executive, and still less to the judiciary. Finally, the structure of the first
three Constitutional articles is strikingly similar.
Each of the first three articles begins with a statement as to where
the branch's power is vested. Following this designation is a provision
concerning the requisite qualifications for office, the term of office,
and the compensation for officers of that specific branch. Furthermore, each article explores the extent of the power of the particular
branch. Thus, the legislature's power extends to the making of laws,
the presidential power incorporates that of commander-in-chief of
the armed forces, and the judicial power extends "to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution .... -,28 However,
one notable difference exists among the three articles. While the
powers of the legislative and executive branches are specifically
defined, the power of the judiciary is not. In section eight of article
one, the Constitution states, "[t]he Congress shall have power to
• .. "; in section two of article two, the document reads "[the
president] shall have the power to...".12 9 No such parallel provision,
however, defines the judicial power.

128.
129.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. art. II,

§ 2.
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The power of the federal judiciary is not defined in article three
or in any other provision of the Constitution. The first section of

article three states that the judicial power shall be vested in certain
courts and that federal court judges shall hold office "during good

behavior" and shall be compensated for their services. 30 Section two
delineates "the federal judiciary's subject matter, original and appellate
jurisdiction.13' The last section defines the crime, proof and method

of punishment for treason. 32 Since a definition of judicial power is
not demarcated in the Constitution, the question arises as to where
a definition of the power can be found. The Articles of Confederation
did not discuss the judiciary's power except to state that the power
would extend to cases of prizes and capture and to disputes between
the states.'13 The state constitutions provided for a separate judicial
branch, but did not explain its power. The prior drafts of the

Constitution, likewise, do not contain a definitional provision. However, an important change takes place between the early and later
drafts which suggests that the framers wanted to extend judicial
power to constitutional issues but would not place limits on the
judicial power.
130. U.S. CONST. art III, § 1.
131.
.S. CONST. art, III, §2. Section two provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and Maritime
Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;to Controversies between two or more States;- between a State and Citizens
of another State;-between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of
the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between
a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be Party, the Supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions,
and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury;
and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have
been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be
at such Place or Places as the Congress may be Law have directed.
Id.
132. U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 3.
133. Articles of Confederation art. IX. In the Articles, the Congress had the
power to appoint "courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the
high seas and establishing for receiving and determining finally appeals in all cases
of captures, provided that no member of Congress shall be appointed a judge of
any of the said courts." Id. Congress would also appoint commissioners or judges
to hear disputes between the states. Id.

1987]

INTERPRETING ARTICLE III

The earliest drafts of the Constitution, that is, the Virginia Plan,13 4
the New Jersey Plany3 5 and the Alexander Hamilton Plan,3 6 extended
judicial jurisdiction only to cases involving captures, national revenue,
interstate disputes, impeachments, national peace and harmony, ambassadors, and treaties. The later drafts of the Committee of Detail
extended judicial jurisdiction to questions "arising under laws passed
by the National Legislature.' ' 37 Finally the Committee of Style

134. See M. FARRAND, supra note 28, at 243-45, 247-50. The Virginia Resolutions were proposed on May 29, 1787 by Edmund Randolph. See id. Amendments
to the Virginia Plan were made by the Convention on June 13-19, 1787. The Virginia
Plan originally required:
That a National Judiciary be established to consist of one or more supreme
tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the National Legislature,
to hold their offices during good behaviour; and to receive punctually at stated
times fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution
shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in office, at the time of
such increase of diminution. That the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals
shall be to hear and determine in the first instance, and of the supreme
tribunal to hear and determine in the dernier resort, all piracies and felonies
on the high seas, captures from an enemy; cases in which foreigners or citizens
of other states applying to such jurisdictions may be interested, or which
respect the collection of the National revenue; impeachments of any National
officers, and questions which may involve the national peace and harmony.
Id. The amended plan differs in omitting jurisdiction over cases of piracies and
captures, cases involving foreigners or citizens of other states, and impeachments of
officers. See id. at 249-50. A significant addition of the amended version is the
statement that "it is the opinion of this Committee that a national government
ought to be established consisting of a Supreme Legislative, Judiciary, and Executive." See id. at 248.
135. M. FARRAND, supra note 28, at 250-53. The New Jersey Plan was proposed
by William Paterson on June 15, 1787. These amendments represented "the views
of the delegates from the small states and of those delegates who were opposed to
a national government or who at least insisted that the central government must
retain some of the federal character of the Articles of Confederation. Nevertheless,
they agreed that the central government needs more power and the proposed
amendments provided for such power." Id. at 250. The New Jersey Plan made a
few changes in the jurisdictional powers of the federal judiciary, the plan. extended
the judicial power to "cases touching the rights of Ambassadors," "in all cases
...in the construction of any treaty or treaties, or which may arise on any of the
Acts for regulation of trade." Id. at 252.
136. M. FAgRPAkN, supra note 28, at 253-55. The plan offered by Alexander
Hamilton contained a very sketchy provision for the federal judiciary.
The Supreme judicial authority of the United States to be vested in twelve
judges, to hold their offices during good behaviour with adequate and permanent salaries. This Court to have original jurisdiction in all causes of
capture and an appellative jurisdiction (from the Courts of the several states)
in all causes in which the revenues of the general government or the citizens
of foreign nations are concerned.
Id. at 254.
137. M. FAnnAND, supra note 28, at 256-69. On July 24 and 26, resolutions
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incorporated, and placed first, the judicial power to hear cases

involving the Constitution. 138 The clear act of the framers in extending
the judicial power to constitutional questions stands in stark contrast
to the clear failure to define the judicial power and suggests that the
Convention did not intend to define the judiciary's power, but did

intend such judicial power to extend to questions of constitutionality.
It is clear from the structure of the Constitution that the framers
intended to create a strong and well-developed federal government.
Furthermore, the delegates planned that the judicial branch would
be as supreme as the legislative and executive branches. Yet, while
the Convention specifically demarcated the power of the executive
and legislature, it did not do so to the judiciary. At the same time,
the delegates were careful to define the jurisdiction of the courts and
to extend this jurisdiction to cases arising under the Constitution.

were submitted to the Committee of Detail which the committee incorporated into
an actual draft of the Constitution on August 6. The resolutions made use of much
of the amended Virginia resolutions. See id at 256. The July 24 resolutions maintained
the amended Virginia resolution provisions with the important exception of the
jurisdiction of the national judiciary. According to the resolutions of July 24, the
authority of the judicial branch extended only to cases "arising under laws passed
by the general Legislature, and to such other questions as involve the National peace
and harmony." Id. at 259. The July 26 resolution contained a property and
citizenship requirement for members of the three branches, but this was not included
in the draft submitted on August 6.
Article XI of the Draft Constitution by the Committee of Detail contained the
provision for the federal judiciary. This article contains virtually all of the elements
of Article III of the Constitution. Section one designates where the judicial power
shall be vested. The second section discusses requirements for holding office and
compensation. These sections mirror the, prior drafts as well as the Constitution's
provisions. Sections four and five examine the "trial of criminal offences" and
impeachment. While the earlier drafts referred to impeachment, the actual constitutional provision deals only with treason. Section three, the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court and includes the jurisdiction conferred on the court in the Virginia
Plan, the New Jersey Plan and in the July 24 resolution. See id. at 267. Thus, the
draft of the committee made clear that the federal judiciary's power would be
coextensive with that of the legislature.
138. M. FARRAND, supra note 28, at 270-96. An amended draft constitution
was submitted to the Committee of Style on September 10, 1787. The amended
draft was the product of the Convention's revision throughout August of 1787.
Article XI once more contained the provision for the federal judiciary. Two striking
changes were made by the Committee: the addition of jurisdiction to "treaties made
or which shall be made under their authority" and to cases "arising under this
constitution.., of the United States." Id. at 281. This draft was basically unchanged
by the Convention, and the Draft of the Committee of style submitted during
September 12-17 was left intact in the present text of the Constitution. The only
major change made by the Committee between the twelfth and seventeenth of
September was consolidating the prior forty-one articles into seven articles; article
III became the provision for the federal judiciary.

1987]

INTERPRETING ARTICLE Ill

The conclusion which can be drawn from this analysis is not that
the Convention intended to assign to the judiciary the power of
judicial review in article three of the Constitution. Instead, the
structure, unity and language of article three reveals that the framers
of the Constitution of 1787 intended to leave the definition of the
judicial power to its own, as well as future, generations. Moreover,
this analysis is consistent with the literary genre of the Constitution;
the framers and their audience understood that the Constitution was
fundamental law in written form capable of being expanded beyond
the written words to meet the changing needs of future generations.
V.

CONCLUSION

An ongoing battle in constitutional scholarship is raging over the
propriety and scope of the federal judiciary's power of judicial
review. In order to determine the legitimacy and scope of the review
power, it is necessary to examine article three of the Constitution.
At present, however, no school of constitutional scholarship has
engaged in a critical analysis of article three. The reason for this
failure is that no current school of constitutional interpretation has
developed principles of textual interpretation by which such an examination can be made.
The exegetical principles necessary for the thorough analysis of
any text are those applied by biblical scholars. Scriptural theologians
examine the historical and literary background in order to ascertain
the meaning of a particular work. The text does not exist in a
vacuum, but is replete with historical and literary influences. The
historical analysis focuses on the historical, political, philosophical,
and sociological forces that affected the author of the passage. The
literary genre, structure, unity ahd language of a provision comprise
its literary background.
Through the application of scriptural exegetical principles, the
scope of the judicial power in article three of the Constitution
becomes clear. At the time of the Convention the delegates recognized
the weakness of the state and federal judiciaries. This weakness was
particularly highlighted in view of unchecked legislative usurpations
of power beyond constitutional limitations. To exert a check and
balance system over the legislature, the Constitution, in marked
contrast to the Articles of Confederation, incorporated a separate
and independent judiciary into the federal government's framework.
However, the Convention could not agree to the means by which
judicial check would be achieved. The revisionary, or veto, power
was clearly unsuitable. The power of judicial review, familiar to the
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framers because of its British and colonial roots and because of its
exercise by state judges, was the subject of great debate among the
delegates. However, this power was never explicitly incorporated into
article three, which left the judicial power undefined. This failure to
delineate the judicial power is in marked contrast to the careful
demarcation of legislative and executive powers and of the subject
matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. Therefore, the only conclusion which can be drawn from the historical and literary background
of article three is that the framers intentionally did not define the
judicial power. The Convention recognized the importance of the
judicial power, but could not agree to the extent of this power. The
framers, therefore, left the role of the judiciary to be defined by
future generations.
Generations of federal judges have accepted the invitation of the
framers to define the judicial power by exercising judicial review.
When a judge exercises judicial review, applying intra or extra-textual
norms, the judge is acting within constitutional parameters and
fulfilling the authorial intent of the framers to act as a check on the
legislative branch.

